Free Will
Do we have it?
If yes:
- when do we get it?
- do other creatures have it?
- could we make a machine to have it?
If no:
- why not?
- how would you demonstrate that we don’t?
Tags: free will
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The Bloggery of Damian Peterson
Great questions! My first response would be to say yes because we are unpredictable but a machine’s responses could be figured out by examining its make up and the software or whatever that runs it. Even if I told you my exact environment right now, my history, my genes – could you predict my next choice with 100 % accuracy? Do other creatures have it – I think so. When do we get it – I’m freely choosing to leave that one for tonight.
Christopher Hitchens claims that we do have free will – that we have no choice about this!
Jack, are we really unpredictable or are we just very complex? If we were able to wind back the clock do you think that some of your actions in the past might have easily gone either way or would you have ended up doing the same?
Ken, yes, I’ve heard that one before – he’s definitely got a way with words that one. Where do you stand on the issue of free will?
From looking around it seems as if atheists generally go with the no-free-will argument and theists with the opposite. I recognise that many people will lean in the direction that best fits their worldview and would be particularly interested to see if there people who hold opposing views to their peers.
Me? I’m totally divided but the people I respect most tend to go with the no-free-will argument. Both sides, in my mind, have convincing arguments but I don’t find arguments like “there must be free will because God gave us free will to choose to sin” or “there is no free will because we are just physical beings” very compelling (or interesting for that matter).
These questions often end up with quantum mechanics thrown in for good measure and often lead to the question of consciousness (which is fascinating all on its own).
I’m interested to hear the conclusions of other people who have considered the issue before.
Theists don’t necessarily go with the opposite. There’s a large group of people who follow Calvinism… but their no free will argument would be different from yours
Yes, I came across the Calvinistic argument with Bnonn and thought it was very interesting. Well thought out too.
For me, whatever the answer to this question is, an important thing that most people will agree on (albeit for differing reasons), is that we do have responsibility. We are responsible for the ‘actions’ we cho… er… um… well… the actions we make. The way we treat our own bodies, the way we treat others, the way we treat our environment…
Personally, I think our own consciousness testifies that we do make real choices. Call this free will if you want. ‘Will’ can mean ‘desire’, so would be interesting to think about things in terms of that (desire)…
Off to bed…
-d-
I think a lot of the problem of discussing free will lies in definitions (doesn’t it always).
We can choose to do things, and be responsible for our choices. But our possible choices (and hence responsibility) is not completely open.
We can’t violate basic properties of reality, physical laws, etc.
And as individuals we cannot make choices which our upbringing and socialisation do not give us permission to. A classic example to me was to hear my professional colleagues criticise Maori because they didn’t avail themselves of educational opportunities (this was 30 years ago). These were people who had been brought up and socialised to accept and pursue education. They just couldn’t see that for some people (many pakeha as well as Maori at that time) the concept of a university education was just completely outside their (and their family’s) experience. I could appreciate that because I had experienced the same attitude in my family.
There are many, many similar examples where our free will is limited.
I think the issues of free will gets tied up with the biological basis of our consciousness. there are those who propose a dualist concept where consciousness can act independently of our material, biological being (the ghost in the machine). All the current evidence suggests that this is not the case. That in fact our consciousness has a material basis (is a material phenomenon).
But just because there are physical, chemical and biological processes underlying our decisions doesn’t mean we ourselves don’t make those decisions. We are those chemical, physical and biological processes. But these processes do limit the decisions we make. After all, our socialisation, prejudices, etc., are all manifested as physical, biological and chemical phenomena within our brain.
I don’t think quantum phenomena are involved – the physical sizes are too large.
Could we make a machine with free will? Yes – one day. Why not?
Dale, I agree with the essence of the ‘responsibility’ argument. In fact, I think what most people are frightened of is that if we say that we are totally products of our environment then we’ll have to let criminals off for the crimes they commit – but even if we take that line we can still say that, in our society and the way it has developed, we don’t accept that kind of behaviour and this is the punishment our society metes out.
If there is no free will (or at least if we acknowledge that many of our actions may be more heavily influenced by our environments that we thought) then I would see the consequences to criminal (or anti-social) acts would be possibly a more effective method of punishment combined with treatment to deal with not only the end result of the act but the root of what caused it in the first place.
I’m interested to explore the boundaries (if there are any) to where we believe we act of our on volition and where we are merely acting as we have been ‘programmed’ to do. In the past I’ve pointed to the example of the fact that I can, in theory, take a child from a young age and turn them into a monster. The fact that I can do this (and when you look at the obvious cycle of abused/abuser) would point to the conclusion that at least some of our behaviours are not of our own free will.
The question is at what point do we determine where we stop acting of our own free will and where it becomes ‘pre-programmed’. Does the fact that I’m drawn to help an elderly person who’s fallen down stem from a choice that I’ve made or is this just a product of years of stimuli from my parents, siblings, teachers, peers, books, TV, genetics and so on? What about other things I ‘choose’ to do?
I know that I at least ‘feel’ like I have free will but also realise that there are lots of other things that I ‘feel’ that I know to be wrong (optical illusions are a great example of this). I’m interested in hearing some arguments either for or against that explore this topic and might be able to shed some light on whether we really have free will and, if we do, how we know that we do (perhaps there is a test that can prove it somehow?) and where it goes from being free will to just a product of our environment and genes.
Sorry Ken, we must have be writing at the same time.
I’ve heard many people make the argument that because there is quantum indeterminacy at the core of everything then this points to free will. I’ve never really fully understood this though (neither do I QM for that matter!) and would see it that even if our actions were determined by the rolling of dice it still doesn’t mean we have free will.
You say that you don’t think QM counts for anything because “physical sizes are too large”. By this do you mean that even though there are weird things that happen at the atomic scale we don’t observe weird things beyond that?
I guess we describe something as weird when it is counter-intuitive.
A lot of reality is weird because our intuitions are derived from our particular evolutionary history and environment. We are now investigating and understanding a much wider part of reality – hence we often see things as weird. After all our current relativistic understanding of time-space and gravity is weird but we can’t yet reconcile relativity with quantum mechanics.
The specific field of quantum mechanics relate to the extremely small. It applies to things like electrons – not to neural structures.
We can understand the effects of electrons, etc., extremely accurately – most of our current technology relies on that. But at the scale of the individual electron our understanding is probabilistic. We can apply the quantum mechanical equations to larger objects – but when we do so they manifest themselves in the typically classical forms. In principle probabilistic explanations can be applied to macro objects but the probability of non-classical events occurring is extremely remote. We know that from experience, let alone the mathematics.
There are different philosophical interpretations of quantum effects – and of course people will try to justify beliefs (or preferences) – many of them supernatural – using one or other of these. It’s only natural that some people will “use” quantum mechanics to provide a mystical explanation of consciousness.
I am aware that some scientists do promote some quantum mechanical explanations of aspects of consciousness. Stuart Hameroff did this in a presentation at the 2006 Beyond Belief: Science, Religion, Reason & Survival conference but it was unconvincing and the reaction of his colleagues suggest his view was very much a minority one. Roger Penrose has also made some suggestions along these lines. Daniel Dennett critiques Penrose’s arguments in his book on Darwin’s dangerous Idea.
I personally think the attempts to “rope in” these speculations to provide a mystical explanation for things like free will is unwarranted – even opportunist.
Really cool stuff to think about…
On ‘physical sizes’ being ‘too large’ (if I’m following the line of thought correctly), it makes me think of a film (or is it more of a marketing device???) I’ve seen called ‘What the Bleep Do We Know?’, where QM theory is translated from micro to macro… The implication being that because there seems to be such mysterious ‘possibility’ at the atomic level, then that is true for ‘my life’ as well… and I can ‘think’ things into being, etc.
It’s interesting, because I do think reality is stranger and more ‘open’ than many perhaps think it is, but at the same time, the conclusions and/or suggestions of this film made me laugh… My wife and I kept thinking, “Gee, this is nice for entertainment for westerners to tickle their imaginations as to whether they can ‘will’ things into existence, but what about some poor child in another part of the world? Can they just ‘will’ a meal into existence? I’m sure their desire for a meal is stronger than our desire (for example) to have a date go well, or whatever…”
Ken,
But I guess the question of the existence and nature of free will isn’t taken to such extremes… How about a more common (and obviously more relevant) example? Take romantic relationships… They seem (at least) to be very fragile things… Two people can stay together or separate, and the ‘distance’ between these two is often closer than we are comfortable with… How does ‘free will’ work in these kinds of scenarios???
Good point about our options being limited. It’s a very helpful one. The question, “Do I have ‘free will’ to turn into a spider?” seems silly in this light.
-d-
One of my daughters recommended ‘What the Bleep Do We Know?’ to me. I have yet to see it (and I do want to) but comments I have heard lead me to think it is an example of the opportunist use of QM.
I’m hardly an expert on romantic relationships but I think there must be material factors limiting free will there. I don’t think we can form such relationships with just anyone. It’s not just a matter of physical attraction (as in lust) but things like common interests, thinking, etc. And then there does seem to be physical factors relating to body chemistry (in the literal sense).
Your reference to “closeness’ is interesting. You yourself recommended the brain science podcasts and I have been finding them very interesting. A recent couple on body maps in the brain could be relevant. These covered peri-personal body mapping – the mapping of the space around us, relevant to tools and other people in our “personal space.” Our intimate partners probably become part of the mapped per-personal space. They actually get mapped in our brain.
Seems to me that our intimate partners actually then occupy a physical part of our brain, probably for a long time after relationships break up. This suggests to me the we can’t have complete free will with respect to such people – we can’t completely control how we think about them and interact with them.
(I think that might have been me who mentioned the Brain Science podcast)
I’ve heard of What The Bleep Do We Know and vaguely recall that it’s put out by the same crowd that did The Secret. I’ve not seen either of them but have talked to people who have and are convinced by their ideology.
It sounds like a load of bollocks to me. The gist of it is that if you wish for something it’ll happen. I fully believe that having a positive attitude can help you with your interactions with other people (you’ll stand a better chance at that job interview if you are positive) and perhaps even improve the way your own body works (a happy demeanour is proven to be useful to good health). But I don’t think that there’s any amount of positive thinking that’ll make a cheque come in the mail – which I believe is one of the examples they use. The thing is, these kinds of claims are really easy to test; all you have to do if you believe this claptrap is sit down in a room with a researcher who will flip coins and you focus on having heads come up. It won’t take long before you see that heads will trend toward 50% the more that the coins are thrown.
Like you said Ken, people from all kinds of ideologies are trying to get on the QM bandwagon to bolster their claims. To the gullible and dim-witted this gives the claims credibility, especially as QM is very much a scientific (and hence, credible) subject.
Dale, I think that trying to discern whether a human romantic attraction is influenced by free will is problematic in that of all the functions in the universe this is probably one of the most complex. It involves a huge number of chemical interactions along with the strange firings of the most twisted and tangled object in the known universe (the human brain) and is deeply rooted in our evolutionary past. If free will truly exists and is involved in human romantic interactions it would be impossible (with our current knowledge) to prove it either way. If free will exists at a simple level it would be better looking for it where we don’t have to contend with something as complex as a human brain. If it only exists in a human brain it might be useful to try to find where in the development of a human brain this free will kicks in. If you believe that there is no free will in a two-cell embryo but that there is in an adult there must be some point where free will comes into play.
Ken, regarding your comment in #10: I think the way you described QM as probabilistic makes a lot of sense to me. I heard once that given the fact that atoms are mostly space it is possible (in theory) to drop a marble onto a sheet of paper and have it go straight through. But that the probability that all the atoms would be aligned just so would be infinitesimally small and for all intents and purposes we can say it’s impossible. Is this the same with QM?
I think QM randomness goes further than just the statistical distribution of atoms/molecules in a marble or sheet of paper. We can apply the same sort of statistical analyses to this as we do to lots of macro situations in nature and society.
In principle we could define exactly the position of any atom in the marble. But it’s different for very small objects. For example, we find that we cannot define the momentum and position of an individual particle like an electron. But we can calculate the probability of it being in any particular position. Consequently we can use the Schrodinger equation to define this probability distribution. When these calculations are done for specific electrons in different atoms we get orbitals which look like smeared out clouds. I understand these as just representing the probability distribution – not meaning that the electron itself is smeared out.
Despite the apparent randomness we can get very accurate description of atoms and of molecular bonding (with molecular electron orbitals representing the same sort of electron distribution
probabilities).
While our inability to define the position of such small objects accurately may seem “weird” (after all we don’t see probability distributions for macro object we are used to) I think the real “weirdness” comes from things like ‘entanglement.’ This refers to experimental results suggesting that particles like electron and photons appear to ‘know’ the properties of each other even though they may be distantly separated. This gets tied up with observation. It’s almost as if the very act of observing a specific property of one photon and determining a property it has, say, may ‘force’ another distant photon to ‘adopt’ a specific related property.
This ‘entanglement’ has allowed ‘teleportation’ of particles (individual photons I think).
So, it all gets pretty weird and the experimental descriptions very convoluted (I find it hard to work out which experiments are real and which are ‘thought experiments’). This has given plenty of room for philosophical interpretations and even the physicists who developed QM theory appear to have split into at least two groups with different philosophical interpretations.
One interpretation talks about observation causing the ‘collapse of the wave function.’ This might just mean that before observation/measurement we can only describe the particle with a wave function describing its probability distribution, after measurement we know the position accurately and the probabilities of its existence in other positions has declined to zero. However, some people want to interpret this as meaning that without the observation the particle doesn’t really exist. And then, of course, the opportunists want to scale up to the macro world to imply that we can create out own reality.
So, I think QM ‘weirdness’ goes beyond simple statistical probabilities we understand in the macro world.
Right, I think I see what you’re saying now; that we can technically discover the position of atoms but that it’s too difficult in practice so we can go with a probability regarding their lined-up-ness but that when it comes to the position of an electron the best we can do even theoretically is give it a probable location.
So is it possible, in theory, for a large object to act ‘weird’ if every single electron happens to be in just the right place or does this quantum ‘weirdness’ only ever affect electrons?
Interesting stuff – as always…
I’m not at all denying the observed physical, material and chemical phenomena which correlate things like attraction. That would be silly. But I still don’t think our choices are made for us, so to speak. A married man, though attracted to another woman, can still choose not to invite her over while his wife’s away – though there may well be plenty of chemical phenomena compelling him to do precisely that… I think sexual restraint may be an interesting example of free will – given that our sexual urges are so much a natural part of us…
Gotta run…
-d-
Hmmmm, the question of infidelity is probably reasonably simple. When we make a ‘choice’ there is often a consequence for making that choice and in situations like marital infidelity it’s not often that you can choose to be faithful or unfaithful and have exactly the same consequences. If the act of infidelity carries a higher consequence then we could reasonably say that it was the consequence rather than a free will choice that caused our actions.
It may be that you’ve been brought up in such a manner that you don’t value fidelity as highly as most and that you are faced with a situation where you are unlikely to face any consequences. In this situation the balance between the positive urges to be unfaithful vs the potential negative consequences might just level out and you may ‘choose’ one or the other. But I’d still say you’d have to prove that it was exactly balanced before you could consider that free will played a part in it. We are as much a slave to our memes as we are to our genes.
You may think that you are ‘choosing’ to stay faithful but surely this is far from a perfectly balanced choice? For a start you believe that God is watching and so even if you were able to get away with it your conscience would be bugging you endlessly. If you didn’t believe in a God perhaps you’d be more prone to infidelity (although the US stats tell a different story) but this still doesn’t say anything about free will, just how strong your motivators are.
The paradox of free will means we’re bound by certain life principles. Freedom doesn’t come without boundaries or a price in a world with an inherited problem of evil. We’d all be dead otherwise.
Torrete Syndrome gives a insight into this. Some sufferers often have uncontrolled thoughts of killing babies and the like, but have enough counter-will to stop themselves from following through with their initial impulse.
I find myself doing the very things I desire not to do, and conversely find myself neglecting to do the very things I desire or know I should do.
I have the choice to continue or change this pattern. Though I know I will need help from another agency.
Some will find this familiar.
BC “a world with an inherited problem of evil” really has no meaning to most people. It doesn’t mean anything to me (in that I don’t understand it and suspect it is not something that can be shown to have a reality). One doesn’t haver to postulate such explanations to recognise the physical, social, legal and emotional limits to freedom – or to be influenced by the latter 3. Conversely, one can have that concept and still violate social, legal and emotional norms.
“a world with an inherited problem of evil” really has no meaning to most people.
Really? Heard of Palestine or Iraq? Or are you just talking philosophically?
Those countries certainly have inherited problems (probably most countries have). And we can certainly characterise the actions of many combatants (on all sides) as “evil” – but they don’t have to be.
Perhaps that’s where “free will” come in.
Personally I find Zimbardo’s concept of a “bad barrel” rather than a “bad apple” in the barrel convincing. He stresses the importance of situational factors which drive people to do bad things.
Of course he does not deny pathological badness or “evil” in a person – but that surely doesn’t apply to the vast majority of people in these situations.
Perhaps I am reacting to it philosophically – it seemed that way to me – sins of the father and all that.
Ken,
Honest question. Do you see any difference between ‘evil’ (whatever that may or may not mean to you) and the ‘violation of social, legal and emotional norms’???
Bad barrel?
Circumstances can be a determining factor in the way people react to pressure situations. Interestingly though, some react completely opposite to others under the same circumstances. Many colluded with the Nazis, but others being staunch and resisting them unto death, standing on grounds of goodness, classifying the Nazis as evil, particularly aware that such a stand was not to their advantage in any way.
Even within our more subtle and comfortably persuasive culture, with its life threatening diseases from toxic substances (high salt/fat/sugar diet, alcohol, tobacco, plastic, exhaust gases, food additives etc), we remain willing to imbibe these things regardless of the consequences. It takes consistent, hard-headed will to change. Generally, western civilisation remains deceived, if the advertising and consumer stats are any indication. Seems that the will definitely needs to be freed.
Honest answer, Dale: I think “evil” (meaning profoundly immoral or wrong) certainly overlaps “violation of social, legal and emotional norms” but does imply the more extreme end.
However, it is sometimes used pretty loosely or inappropriately. I guess a lot of language is like that.
However, when the word gets used in some sort of “relgious/philosophical” way like “original sin” or “inherited evil” it gets “loaded.” I guess that’s why many people prefer to keep away from such words. However, I think Zimbardo, who has done such important work in this area, does occasionally use the word.
BC, Zimbardo’s use of “bad barrel” was a response to the US administration blaming the Abu Ghraib prison atrocities by US troops in Iraq on a few “bad apples.” He strongly believes the people who should have been prosecuted for the atrocities are those in the military high command and political administration. Bush’s recent veto of the bill outlawing “water baording” torture sort of supports that view.
I think the research shows that even for the Nazis situational factors entrapped otherwise decent people into committing evil acts.
I certainly agree “that the will definitely needs to be freed.” And consequently I am pleased that Zimbardo carried on his research to look at cases where people were about to stand up and do the morally right thing. He sees this work at helping to encourage us all to resist situational factors and become “heroes”, “whistle-blowers”, etc.
It would be interesting to direct some of that research into the apparently more mundane issues of “life threatening diseases from toxic substances (high salt/fat/sugar diet, alcohol, tobacco, plastic, exhaust gases, food additives etc).” How do we encourage people to stand up agaionst those situational factors?
BC,
But does this point to free will or merely to a different set of inputs for different people? Could we look at certain people and say that if they’d been brought up in a different family or had different genes that they might have acted differently?
I think an interesting area to look into would be identical twins (sharing the same genes) who have been in the same family environment and (as closely as possible) the same life experiences. It would be in these scenarios that if you could demonstrate vast differences in behaviour that a case for free will might be made.
If the physicalists (of which I’m probably one) are claiming that we are merely a product of our genes and our environment then to determine whether there really is a thing called ‘free will’ it would help to eliminate differences in genetics and environmental effects.
Does anyone know of any identical twins who have very different behavioural patterns that is not easily explained by some important life experience?
Thanks Ken,
Hadn’t heard of Zimbardo before, but his Stanford prison experiment (while interesting in principle) seems problematic… The Wiki article says, “The experiment was widely criticized as being unethical and bordering on unscientific. Current ethical standards of psychology would not permit such a study to be conducted today.”
The ‘volunteer’ element alone would mean that, psychologically, the subjects would know it was not ‘real’ – which makes on wonder if that could have even contributed to the abusive results (ironically far more ‘real’ than the experiment) and pre-mature ending of the experiment?
Anyway, I’m not trying to negate or downplay Zimbardo’s conclusions about evil. I don’t know enough to even comment…
gotta run…
Cheers,
-d-
True Dale – Zimbardo himself criticises it as unethical. It would never be allowed today as the scientific community now does a lot to police itself ethically. Interestingly the experiment had to be terminated early because the effects became so extreme. Zimbardo acknowledges that as the administrator he became sucked in to the situations. He was brought down to earth (and then stopped the experiment) by a colleague who harshly criticised him when she became involved and saw the inhuman practices that had developed (Zimbardo later went on to marry this colleague).
There is always the “knowing” effect in such experiments (and other uncontrolled effects in observing “real life”). But I suspect that putting the two approaches together Zimbardo’s findings are pretty well confirmed. (I would imagine “knowing” would reduce the abuse – but maybe not).
Perhaps a lot of the “reality TV” game shows (survivor?) show these effect. Just divide people into two teams, give them a different coloured uniform, and before long they end up hating each other.
I found Zimbardos book (The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil) very informative. It goes much further than his own experiments (and those of others like Asch and Milgram). It’s latter sections deal with ways of overcoming the situational influences and understanding why it is that some people actually react differently and do good rather than evil.
So I think his work holds out hope.
Damian, Steven Pinker discusses some of the identical twins findings in his book The Blank Slate. I think he indicates that current knowledge is that genetic effects could explain up to 50% of variation, family environment about 10 – 15% and the rest social environment in general. So a lot of similarity in behaviour is found with identical twins (even ones brought up in separate families) and far less in fraternal twin or normal siblings.
It’s interesting that family environment (normally) has so little effect (the research methodology excluded abnormal situations like abuse which obviously could have over-riding effects).
So I think it’s easy to find behaviour patterns based on genetics and also easy to find patterns based on environmental and/or chance effects.
Ken, I’ve just purchased Blank Slate and look forward to reading it.
I’ve just re-read many of the comments in this topic and would like to ‘pick the scab off’ again as it were.
BC and Dale, I take it from your comments that you fall on the ‘free will’ side of the argument and that you are both Christians. Many Christians I’ve met seem to think that only humans have free will – probably something to do with our relationship with God? – but that other animals don’t. Do you share the same views? If so, would you care to define at which point in human development you believe we receive free will and what it is that we can observe as a difference between animals and humans with regard to actions of free will?
If you think that some animals do have free will can you try to define where you might think the boundary between free will and mechanistic animals is? And would an animal with free will be able to ‘sin’?
I’m not trying to set traps here – just wanting to explore where possible boundaries might be and what the reasons for them are.
Hi Damian,
I’m quite happy to see ‘free-will’ in a gradient sense. Bacteria, ants, mice, dogs, dolphins, chimps, humans… no problem.
‘Sin’ has often been thought of in terms of ‘breaking’ or ‘disobeying’ a law, while I think it should be understood in terms of ‘vocational failure’. One of the main things that makes humans different from all other animals is that we have the most ‘power’, as it were. We really do ‘rule the world’. That’s basic Judeo/Christian anthropology. To put it in relational terms, humans are “over creation and under the Creator”. So when a human fails to use the abilities he/she has (or use them properly), this is not only ‘sin’ in terms of failing at the human vocation, but also ‘sin’ in terms of breaking the relational structure between creation and Creator. A human being ought not behave as if he/she were an animal, neither should a human being behave as if he/she were the Creator.
I find it very interesting that humans are thought to be the point where evolution stops, because (as I’ve heard it said) we’ve ‘mastered our environment’… That, for me (biologically and theologically), would be the primary difference between animals and humans.
Does that help?
Yes, thanks Dale.
Heh, ‘vocational failure’… I like that
You may have heard me say this from time to time. What I mean by this is that evolution requires ‘environmental pressure’ to occur and when you are the master of your environment there’s not a lot that’s going to select for new traits. But it’s not true that we’ve stopped evolving; it’s just been slowed down considerably. And we aren’t true masters of our environment yet. There still are things that can happen that might apply this ‘pressure’ and force changes on our species – a good example of this would be a new pandemic that is fatal in people with certain genes.
I haven’t really looked into this properly though and there may be people out there with evidence that suggests otherwise.
Thanks for your answer though – I’ll mull on this for a while.
Ginger Campbell has an interesting discussion of free will in her podcast Books and Ideas #12: Does Free Will Exist?. I think this does reinforce the necessity of precise definition as she is someone who believes in free will, but not the free will (resulting from a dualist approach)outlined in the book she discussed. As always, he presentation is excellent.
I hope you enjoy The Blank Slate, Damian. I have just finished reading Matt Ridley’s “Nature via Nurture” and can highly recommend it. He certainly clarifies information for a layperson and the content is fascinating.
I guess free will and determinism is again one of those perspective things. As we humans do not have knowledge of all things at our fingertips, we can not know all the consequences or influences of voluntary or involuntary decisions we make and actions we take. Even though we can under examination categorise the characteristics of participants’ physiology, psychology and cultural and environmental makeup, we will only have an indication of what, under certain circumstances, what probable influences are present.
The definition/application of free will is therefore problematic.
Obviously freewill has nothing to do with dumb ideas such as making a round square or floating into space unassisted, or indeed God making something too heavy for him to shift etc etc.
Free will becomes obvious when a decision and action is taken despite known circumstances, makeup and consequences would normally give a contrary result or we know the process by which the individual made their final decision. Under these circumstances, where there is presented a set of consequences for actions taken, and we still willingly go against best practice and we demonstrate what we would call being stupid, free will seems most definite.
Pollution for instance would illustrate this quite well. Where not only scientific evidence shows that poisoning the environment is stupid, because it is basically killing us and the planet, but also pollution destroys relationships between perpetrators and victims.
Damian, as far as animals having free will, there probably is the perspective of a two tiered freewill. First, where man has a moral responsibility because of the ‘knowledge of good and evil’ under which we become responsible for on-going consequences of decisions and actions made in that ‘light’.
Secondly, animals demonstrate freewill in that they are free to forage for food, apparently unhampered even under the purposeful direction of instinct. Also, not being made in ‘the image of God’, and they were not co-perpetrators of sin, a moral code with its innate responsibilities do not apply to them. Unfortunately they have become some of the victims in the overall breakdown of relationships as a result of sin.
Where genetic tendencies seem to answer the question of a ‘evil’, since sin is such a fundamental cosmic principle, would it not be surprising that sin has had effects on the gene and meme pool? After all not all genes have detrimental effects, just as sin is but a substantial marring of the image bearing (made in the image of Elohim) ability of mankind. Here there could be scope for the idea of restorative gene building, by repetitive, disciplined behaviour control to bring an individual back to an ‘even keel’.This has been demonstrated by the physical restoration of crash victims re-learning faculties lost after an accident.
The problem with this and your example of how we humans are willing to poison ourselves with pollution is that all it’s really demonstrating is that we have other, stronger motivators than our ‘common sense’. Unless you are defining ‘free will’ as “the ability to go against reason”?
I’m intrigued by your last three paragraphs. You seem to be saying that free will is somehow tied to moral responsibility (which I can kind of dig) but you also appear to be saying that only humans have this moral responsibility – and hence, free will? Where do you see free will (and moral responsibility) occurring in human development? Do you think it’s a gradual process or more of an on/off thing? Or is it there from conception?
Does free will have the ability to go against reason? Here, I take it, that you mean by reason, the careful thought process of working out or knowing the pros and cons of a certain decision and that decision’s consequences. Then, yes, exactly, free will can go against reason.
As far as animals having a free will with moral responsibility, I’m not convinced.
As far as human development is concerned, moral responsibility is heightened when an individual is demonstrating a knowledge of good and evil. As all individuals are marred by sin, free will with moral responsibility comes with eternal consequences. You can’t turn back the clock and undo the things you shouldn’t have done, or do the things that you should have done.
Free will as an on/off thing? Free will is continuous, since every action is judged by the consequences. We do things consciously and unconsciously. Obviously those things we do consciously we are explicitly responsible for (whether or not there mitigating circumstances). For those unthinking moments, we are also responsible, because we did them and they also have consequences. If we broke a law unwittingly or to us an unknown law, would we be guilty or not guilty of breaking the law?
We are, if you like, culpable on two levels. One, at a wilful level and the second at a consequential level. One, we can modify by various means, the second is naturally inescapable.
BC, the question I asked was whether you were “defining ‘free will’ as ‘the ability to go against reason’” not whether free will has the ability to go against reason. There’s a difference there that’s a little subtle but fairly important. I’ll rephrase it: Do you think that when you see someone act against reason this is an indication of free will?
When I see someone act against reason I automatically look for some other motivating factor rather than attribute it to Genuine Free Will™. If someone continues to smoke after being told it will give them cancer I would first look at the possibility of them having an addiction to cigarettes that is a stronger motivator than the logical reason to give up.
It may be that you are defining free will differently from me. It may be that you are saying that the fact that one of many paths was ‘chosen’ demonstrates free will. The argument against this of course is that there really was only one path that could have possibly been chosen but that on the surface without all the information it appeared that there were many, equal choices to be made.
I heard a good analogy for this once: If you toss a coin you naturally think it’s got a 50% chance of being heads but if we were to measure every movement of your arm and fingers as well as the distance to the floor and its deflection and so on we would be able to give you a 100% accurate prediction. The same thing could be said of a human action: With limited information about what makes a person tick we really don’t know how they will act in a given circumstance but if all the factors were to be known the physicalist would argue that we could (in theory) predict their actions.
One of the reasons that people like to introduce quantum mechanics is that at the quantum level things like spin up/down are (apparently) truly random. Everything else that we observe has a chain of causes that, in theory, if all of the data were known we would be able to predict what comes next. The physicalist sees the actions of a human the same as the tossing of a coin; get enough information and you’ll be able to predict what happens next. Generally, an advocate for free will argue that the mind consists of something non-physical (classic philosophy of mind dualism) or that somehow quantum mechanics plays a part in allowing us to have random actions.
In order to address the question of free will you need to be considering these kinds of objections and not just asserting things like “Free will becomes obvious when a decision and action is taken despite known circumstances” or “As all individuals are marred by sin” and so on. I realise that you are arguing from a worldview that is based on the Christian religion but with discussions such as this it’s not helpful to make assertions. It’s OK to say that “[The Bible says/I believe] that all individuals are marred by sin” but it’s not really all that useful. It’s a small detail but it really helps when you want to have a constructive conversation.
I hope we’re not trying to count how many angels can fit on the head of a pin.
Damian says,
“When I see someone act against reason I automatically look for some other motivating factor rather than attribute it to Genuine Free Will™. If someone continues to smoke after being told it will give them cancer I would first look at the possibility of them having an addiction to cigarettes that is a stronger motivator than the logical reason to give up.”
and
“It may be that you are defining free will differently from me. It may be that you are saying that the fact that one of many paths was ‘chosen’ demonstrates free will. The argument against this of course is that there really was only one path that could have possibly been chosen but that on the surface without all the information it appeared that there were many, equal choices to be made.”
My guess is we are talking a great deal at cross purposes.
Does free will exist?
In an ideal world or having the ‘mind of God’, free will would be an anomaly. We would operate as complete, independent, free beings, subconsciously obeying all the laws-of-being, unaware of alternatives, challenges or persuasive arguments. Presumably that would be the scenario in which the brand ‘Genuine Free Will™’ comes to view.
But as it is, we don’t have that perspective.
It would be unreasonable to say that we factor-in every possibility for every decision we take, but it is reasonable to say we make decisions without all the facts before us; we don’t know the end to the beginning regarding causes or consequences. The decisions we make despite the consequences and in spite of the known causes, surely counts as free will.
Someone who smokes addictively was once a non-smoker and presumably wasn’t born smoking! The addiction, due to chemical poisoning, is a physical, mind-bending process rather than an innate character of the person’s mind. Millions have overcome this powerful addiction by retraining the mind. Motivated by regaining good health, but having made the hard decision and with persistence, even though the greater addictive power could still overcome, they have reformed. To look back and say, that the smoker measured the pros and cons of smoking verses good health and acted accordingly is misleading. It denies the willpower and determination of the sufferer to overcome the disease.
However, some would see both cause and consequence impinging on the decision making process, thus discounting free will.
Somewhere in the middle, despite our knowledge and ignorance, there is room for our free will to operate. Our society and justice system works on that premise; that we are responsible for our actions and are eligible to reap the rewards or liable to pay the price.
My guess is that in a great number of people’s minds, the idea of a completely deterministic world, denies our innate desire for justice and freedom. For if determinism is dominant, then where does that place our sense of responsibility? If there is no place for responsibility to be demonstrated by physical determinism, then by what means or will is there to implement a functioning, ordered and cohesive society that we currently have?
It would seem here too, that if all thought processes, and thus actions, are determined by a physical, and somewhat hidden, process, then what becomes of rational thought, which presumably can not regarded as a product of deterministic process? If it were, then no one would think rationally. And any rational thinking, about free will or (physical) determinism is but an illusion.
In regard to your final comment, my take is that the differences in our worldviews may have more to do with whether something is useful to constructive conversation, than with any unsubstantiated, assertions I may have made. Naturally any assertions made are essentially opinion, as there is no intent in conveying to you that I know all, but rather trying to represent honestly my understanding as straightforwardly as possible. Hopefully there is time to ‘unpack’ any such assertions at a later date.
This stuff about ‘responsibility’ is, I think, one of the most important aspects of this conversation. As you say, BC, even if (hypothetically) we have no free will, most/all humans behave as though there is…
-d-
BC, I think we may be still talking past each other with regard to what you would see as someone utilising free will in the case of the smoker and where I would see it as more likely to be a series of various motivators.
If we were to fully dissect the reasons (and I think that even in an apparently random system like a human there are reasons underpinning everything we do) I’d suggest that we’d find that there were a series of events that led to the person taking up smoking in the first place. Perhaps he looked up to an uncle that smoked or any number of film stars. Perhaps the puff behind the bike sheds because of peer pressure. Perhaps a deep feeling of self-destruction (as in my case when I was younger and smoked). And the combination of these environmental as well as mental (which I’d argue is purely physical as well) effects conspire to keep a person addicted.
I suspect that you are coming from the – understandable – assumption that the mind is a free entity and that could be what is causing us to talk past each other. Is this correct? That you think that the mind is not purely physical and the result of purely physical processes?
Also, I was quite intrigued by your comment “then what becomes of rational thought, which presumably can not regarded as a product of deterministic process”. Would you care to go into this a little further and explain why it is you see rational thought as a product of a non-deterministic process?
Dale and BC,
You are quite right to consider the impact that the free will issue has on personal responsibility but I’d suggest that whatever the implications are shouldn’t be reason enough to disregard the issue.
When you look at an ant colony you may be lucky enough to see ‘justice’ being dispensed. Perhaps an ant is in some way genetically faulty and randomly attacks other ants. Without apparent free will other guard ants will intervene in the best interests of the colony. I’d contend that if we were to find that we don’t have free will as we imagine it to be we’d not lose our ability to say as a society “no, this behaviour is unacceptable” in the same way we can observe in very simple creatures. I’d also contend that knowing that some people act the way they do because of their genes or their environment may actually help us to find more appropriate solutions to their behaviour – especially if our end-goal is to achieve a functional community rather than merely some sense of justice in the form of retribution.
On this topic, if you get the chance I thoroughly recommend a podcast that Ken put me onto called Science and the City and look for the recent one called “The Neuroscience of Fair Play” by Donald Pfaff.
My understanding (in terms of ontology/being) of the mind/brain issue basically (exactly?) parallels my understanding of the soul/body. I see our spirit/soul as being fully and totally embodied; the parallel is that I see the mind/heart/etc. as being fully and totally (to coin a phrase) en-brained… I don’t think we’ll ever find a ‘ghost in the machine’, then; at the body or brain level.
Off to bed,
-d-
Damian,
. We accept a conditional conclusion about something, after recognising that the conditions of acceptance have been meet. The evidence is ‘seen’ as justifying the conclusion, having established in our mind that the principle of reason and types of logic have been applied to the evidence. This then is rational insight applied using reasoning. The brain function is not determined by the matter under consideration and the matter under rational consideration is not determined by a change in physical influences on brain function. The reasoning within rational insight remain constant. With this understanding it is difficult to see that physical determinism captures the entire world of human decision making.
As far as has be examined, even from a genetic perspective, predisposition does not necessarily mean the take up of smoking is automatic. The Monday Herald had an interesting article on just that point, in particular about smoking.
Even if you can detect motivators, are they really deterministic or just descriptive of the course of events in a person’s life? Even though it may have the appearance of supporting a person’s decision to smoke, there appears to be room for choice. Not everyone who has a smoking Uncle necessarily takes up smoking. In fact, some may be deterred from smoking or drinking or violence, because of its effects on immediate family.
Brain function may show up as a reaction to stimulus from outside the brain through the sense organs. It is also indicated that brain structure can be re-constructed through such outside stimuli. Although firing between neurones can be controlled by this process thus influencing the structure, so too the pre-existing structure plays a role in the final outcome. So the problem arises, what degree are we ‘hard-wired’ or programmed or may be have software running that can actually adapt the hardware?
That aside, as far as the mind being a free entity, I see it as being free enough to take independent decisions, even though genetic and circumstantial ‘pressures’ may or may not be evident. I don’t see the mind as separate within a physical cocoon, no body/mind dualism (except as a descriptive) but regard us as an integrated whole (soul). However, I don’t see us as purely physical. I see the physical as part of a dynamic energy; an energy spectrum we are yet fully to apprehend in our present state and by which we are limited in describing as physical. It is not that which is beyond the physical, but is what ‘powers’ the physical processes we see. To such physical processes we attribute too much as the source of life.
To a degree, the attribution to physical processes in sustaining life, even down to the biochemical reaction written as mathematical statements, are but a way of constructing a story about reality. Those statements may have symmetry (even in complexity), be simple, logical and therefore recognised as to being the true picture of facts about reality. But, of course, I have covered the problem of knowledge earlier, where knowledge is limited to current categories and methods of reasoning within scientific methodology. Even there the scientific facts can become part of a just-so story.
Regarding rational thought as a product of a non-deterministic process, links into this concept of an energy that creates and sustains all things. Although some may like to think it can be detected in symbols within molecular structures (eg Louie Giglio’s Laminin), it is much more fundamental within the nature of things. As described above, it is presently undetectable by current scientific tools, except for those parts revealed in what is called physical.
For (some) Biblical readers this ‘energy’ would be described as the Word, as John describes in his Gospel. Here John says the Word, that in the beginning, was with God and was God, became flesh and came to live with us. So John represents Jesus as the living demonstration of the spectrum of this energy (as we do, but incompletely) but we have, to date, so poorly perceived in so many ways, scientifically, artistically and communally.
But back to rational thought
This may be demonstrated when folk are asked why they like a song, and reply because they liked the smile on the singer’s face. The smile on a singer’s face is not evidence that can be used to support the integrity of the song. In a deterministic world they might accept the song because of some environmental or physical stimulus (such as a smile), rather than by using a rational insight with supportive evidence.
Here’s a succinct argument I came across for why it’s not logical to believe in free will at the same time as a god who knows the future. It goes like this:
Imagine I have a fax machine that is able to send faxes back in time. I ring you up and get you to come around to my house where I’m going to get you to send a fax. An hour before you arrive I receive the fax you sent.
When you arrive I can show you the fax you sent and because it’s what actually happened you are predestined to proceed to send that exact fax which means that you don’t have free will and it won’t even feel like you’ve got free will. But even if I don’t show you the fax you are still destined to send it even though you may not necessarily know what you are going to write. But I will know and that’s the clincher; you still don’t have free will. You have to write what I already know.
Presented logically:
proposition 1: God knows what you are going to do before you do it (he’s received the fax)
proposition 2: You have to do what god has foreseen (regardless of whether he shows you the fax or not)
conclusion: You have no choice in what you do. i.e. no free will
In essence, if someone knows what you are going to do in the future then you have no free will. It’ll only appear to be so from your point of view if you haven’t been told what it is you are going to do.
So, to rationally believe in free will you have to at least not believe in a god who knows the future. To believe that a god does know the future but gives us free will is illogical.
I don’t see what rationality there is in your argument.
In what way does any god, (or anyone else for that matter) who may know what I am about to do next, simply by having that knowledge, influence what I am going to do next?
Hi BC! I’m glad you checked back in; I realise I left it a long time between comments.
To your question:
If you know (not just guess – actually know) ahead of time what I am going to do in a given situation then I have but one choice truly available to me. Even though it may seem that I have many.
Perhaps you perceive that an apparent choice is the same as free will? If so then we’ll probably need to get back to basics and define to each other what we mean by free will (I’ve heard it said that one of the biggest issues with free will is the definition
).
I personally don’t believe that there is an all-knowing god out there so am merely pointing out the logical inconsistency of believing in both genuine free will and an omniscient god.
And my question remains unanswered, ‘In what way does any god, (or anyone else for that matter) who may know what I am about to do next, simply by having that knowledge, influence what I am going to do next?’
Yes, definition of anything is always a problem when communicating.
The knowledge of the outside agent knowing what I will do next, only influences the free will actions of that agency, not that of the object or event observed by that agency. My free will is not constrained by the pre-knowledge of an outside agency. Knowledge of a object or event does not determine the actual nature of the object or the event, unless the outside agency decides to act on that knowledge and influence the nature of the object or event. Determination has to do with relational acts not just having knowledge.
Our observation and knowledge of an particular atom does not predetermine the nature or activity of that atom unless, of course, in observing that atom we have disturbed its natural, pre-observational existence, (which, interestingly enough, we may do!).
Are our definitions of knowledge different?
The fact that an unknown, external agency may or may not determine how and what we do, is outside our knowledge. Individual free will operates with the knowledge we have.
Hopefully, we had left behind the super-duper brand of free will called, ‘Genuine Free Will’. This type of free will covers the absurd scenarios of being able to float off into space at random, or construct a round square.
In regards to your belief that there is no all-knowing god, does that mean you have evidence that there is no such being or is it that you feel there is a lack of evidence that would satisfy your belief that there is a god out there (all-knowing or otherwise!)?
(by ‘out there’, I don’t mean out in space, but meaning in the way that a rock or flower is ‘out there’, independent of your individual observation).
BC,
I suspect that the keyword here is ‘influence’. If you know what is going to happen in the future then there are no ‘choices’ or ‘options’ for what is going to happen. There’s no ‘influencing’ in the traditional sense going on. Just a statement of fact about what you will do in the future.
If god were to speak to you right now and tell you that he knows that you will go down the path of c instead of a, b or d then do you think you will be able to go down any path but c? Do you have any choices even though it may have otherwise appeared that a, b and d were equally valid options?
If god were to speak to you right now but not tell you what he knew about your future choice do you think you’d be able to choose any path but what he secretly knows? If god knows all of your future ‘choices’ you are left with only apparent choices and you can only choose what he already knows you will choose.
Therefore; no free will.
Unfortunately, the given scenario muddies the boundaries of knowledge and timeframe of the observer and the observed.
If the observer knows what is going to happen to the observed in the future, then it appears there are no ‘choices’ or ‘options’ for the observed in what is going to happen. However, this only deals with the knowledge and time of the observer and not with the knowledge and time of the observed person.
In contrast, the observed, within their knowledge and time, makes a free will decision, because they are ignorant of the final decision they make prior to making it, and also ignorant of the outcome at the time the decision is made. This take place, in fact, in the reality of the space-time continuum in which we live.
It deals with where we are, and not with something abstract like Zeno’s Achilles and the tortoise paradox.
Unfortunately, if you believe in the God of the Bible then you believe in a god who appears frequently throughout our space-time continuum (whatever that really means) and at every appearance he’s supposed to have known everything about the future. Trying to totally remove this particular god into another time dimension is going to require a major rewrite of the Bible.
What I’ve sort of been hoping for with this topic is a fruitful discussion of evidence/logic-based objections or support for the concept of free will.
Imagine a person (and this has nothing to do with free will) comes across a field with crop circles in it. This person makes the assumption that aliens must have made the patterns. This was probably not the best conclusion to jump to but you can sort of understand how it came about. This person takes photos and, after telling everyone that aliens have visited, goes off to spend long nights studying the patterns to try to discern what they must mean. In the meantime, down at the pub a reporter comes across a couple of lads who are bragging about how they pulled the wool over everyone’s eyes by making the crop circles themselves. They even take the reporter to see the equipment they used to trample the grass.
Now, the reasonable thing the person who discovered the ‘crop circles’ should probably do is admit that he’d been suckered and have a good laugh with everyone. But we all know what human nature is really like and you just know that this otherwise ordinary person is going to go deeper and deeper into this obsession creating more and more elaborate explanations for what was really just a bad initial assumption and it’s going to be embarrassing for all involved. (This little diversion is based on a real story.)
Now, back to the topic of free will: I don’t know if we have free will or not. I’ve heard many good arguments both for and against. But I feel that the arguments you are presenting are heading down the same path that the crop circle discoverer where they are becoming detached from reality (with space-time continuums and effects of knowledge of the observer on the observed, etc). I know you’re going to find that last sentence annoying because it so casually dismisses what you clearly hold dear but I’d like to give you the opportunity to ‘un-wed’ yourself from it just a little so we can get back to an objective conversation.
Perhaps you’d like to present some of the best arguments you know of that argue against free will? (even if you don’t necessarily agree with them)
Last month a magazine that I subscribe to, New Scientist, had an an article about a study that had been done that measured activity in the brain (by way of fMRI) when people are making choices.
The test subjects were asked to take as long as they liked to press a button with their left or right hand. It usually takes about half a second for a thought to manifest itself as an action (probably to do with the distance the nerve impulses have to travel?). What they found was that different parts of the brain would light up depending on which button they were going to press and that this area would light up something like 7 seconds prior to them ‘thinking’ they had made the choice.
I have a couple of issues with the study though; They were only able to predict with 60% accuracy what a person was going to press (which is not far off pure chance) and they were only studying 14 people.
I’d like to see this study replicated over a large number of people and perhaps performed by multiple, independent groups.
If it turns out that our brains are ‘deciding’ what to do a significant time before we think we’ve consciously made the decision do you think this would be a valuable contribution to the issue of free will?
Somewhat related to this is an experiment described by nueroscientist Rudolfo Linas in a Science Network (The Science Studio)video. He asserts that there is no such thing as “free will” – but of course he has a specific definition in mind.
The experiment was done on him personally using inter-cranial magnetic probing – this enables non-intrusive activation of areas of neurons (similar to what has been done with electrical probing in open skull investigations). This probing activated a response (say moving his foot to the left). He then undertook to exert his “free will” to move his foot to the right while he was being probed. In every case he ended up moving his foot to the left!
Now he says that subjectively it was his own decision – he changed his mind at the last minute. But, of course, he sees the change in mind as being a result of the probing. So there is no free will in the sense of a consciousness outside the material brain. But there is free ill in the sense of a decision made by the material brain. Part of that decision is the firing of specific neurons and this can be initiated externally.
Hmmmm, that’s an interesting one Ken.
It could be argued that the probes were only overriding a step in the process and that his free will still exists. Say our free will is a little ‘person’ inside our heads and there are lots of ropes and pulleys that are used to activate different parts of the body. The probe could be ‘tugging’ on the ropes and causing us to do things that are against the will of the little guy in the brain and that wouldn’t be proof against the existence of free will.
In the same way that I can grab your arm and, if I’m strong enough, make your arm do things that you don’t want it to do. Which wouldn’t necessarily disprove your free will.
I haven’t had a chance to watch the video yet as I have to dash out for the day but I’ll take the time to look at it later on this evening (and the others there look good too!). It’s quite possible that I’ve misunderstood your summary of the experiment.
Too much can be read into statements made regarding an understanding of the connection and causation between different sets of knowledge and time.
sorry, basic) laws of nature that can be discovered in the light of this deterministic outlook.
Since one set, defined as mankind’s knowledge and time, is but a subset of another, God’s. Such a distinction is only dealing with quality differences and is not proposing a discontinuity of reality. Man’s knowledge and time deals only with that part of God’s creation that mankind has, in our timeframe, discovered and defined by various means, together with that which is said to have been revealed by God to mankind. The fact that there is a dimensional difference doesn’t necessarily mean that God is excluded from our space-time continuum, but that God’s presence together with considerable parts of the universe’s physicality, is masked. The Bible has several passages where this reality is indicated.
How we regard this particular view, depends on the type of evidence we seek to use as proof in uncovering reality’s secrets. Proof of anything is based on those presuppositions that demand a degree of acceptance and viability of the evidence. In other words, as has been expressed elsewhere on other occasions, facts don’t speak for themselves but rather it is by rationality applied to the process of formulating the raw data into cohesive and consistence statements.
From the beginning we need to understand that determinists and free willers both make choices. The differences are not in the common experience of decision making, but in the interpretation of that experience. It is also apparent that determinists realise there are consequences to choices made, so like the majority of sane people, they don’t live recklessly. Interestingly enough this implies that determinists recognise they can influence the course of history by their choices, but at the same time hold the view that some how the decision made is made for them by unseen influences, which are generally seen as being from a physical source. Hence the perception held by determinists of an over-arching determinism, innate in the processes of the universe. Propositionally, this interpretation then becomes a metaphysical datum.
This includes the idea of sufficiency, where anything that happens, happens because there is sufficient reason (albeit hidden) for it to have happened that way. This is a necessary presupposition or methodological assumption of science. That beneath (or over if you prefer) everything, that there is, was or is to be, are fundamental (
Many laws in chemistry and physics indicate certain verifiably, measurable constants, providing a bolster to a deterministic perception. The extension of this perception, through such sciences as biology, psychology and sociology, is applied to humanity, as we are also a product of this universe. But the fact remains that determinism is an assumption that necessarily colours the method and interpretation of scientific inquiry.
As Bertrand Russell once said, ‘A physicist looks for causes; that does not necessarily imply that there are causes everywhere. A man may look for gold without assuming that there is gold everywhere; if he finds gold, well and good, if not he’s had bad luck. The same is true for when the physicist looks for causes.’
Interestingly enough, a less deterministic picture in quantum mechanics would imply, through the use of statistics of particle relations, a substantial nondeterministic dimension to the universe. Here, rather than statistical evidence pointing to yet to be discovered deterministic laws of the universe, they presently indicate a great degree of nondeterministic behaviour. Human behaviourism is another area of study heavy with statistical evidence that has created such doubts.
Applying this to decision making, the proposition of deterministic methodology can follow and modify the results until the cows come home, without establishing any correlation between strongest motive and decision making, especially when the motives are unknown. This can make such evidence trivial, ending up with a just-so story of nothing more than that we always act on the motive that we act upon!
As we know there are great differences between worldviews in understanding how and why we understand what we understand as being true. Worldviews bear on, and in turn are modified by, that process of understanding. Some, such as materialistic determinism (Richard Dawkins, Carl Sagan), refer only to specific forms of physicality of the universe with little informed reference to history, philosophy or religion. (A surprising self-confession on the part of Richard Dawkins, in his recent appearance at Edinburgh). The choice there is based on that assumption that ‘all there is, all there ever was, and all there ever will be’, measured only in physical terms. However, we know we experience life in many ways that cannot be verified in absolute terms of empiricism. History is but one of those.
One fallacy that plagues the free will issue is the assumption that free willers deny any outside influence in decision making. However, it is exactly those influences and factors that we all include in the matrix of factors involved in coming to a free will decision. No one exists in an intellectual or existential vacuum.
In regard to where you feel I am misled regarding the influence of knowledge between the observer and observed, is that I believe that knowledge not communicated has no effect on others. What I don’t know, I can’t work with. Unseen influences are coercive, but unknown knowledge being what it is, is not.
Strong arguments against free will? Well, someone else only having foreknowledge of my decisions before I make them is not one. (Does the tree falling in the forest make a noise if no one is there to hear it scenario)
One argument could be that, if God’s omniscience influences all the intricacies of universal inter-relationships to perfect God’s will, then everything and everyone would thereby be under God’s direct control, with no options. The fact (especially in the light of post-enlightenment materialistic determinism) that God’s hand in cosmic affairs is considerably masked, makes it difficult to appreciate that we can’t make decision’s without undue coercion from God. Therefore, for the vast majority (and none for atheists) of our decisions, there is no knowledge of coercive acts from a controlling agent, prescribing our actions; hence we end up with a scenario within which our decisions are made in a reality of universal ignorance of the future.
Alternatively, materialism may insist that since we are only physical, therefore brain activity, caused by external and internal stimuli on the brain’s structure, indicates the source of our reasoning. If this is so, why and how do we have within our personal understanding and in broad society, in most if not all cultures, universal ideas of intelligence, freedom, justice and necessity, which would, in a determinist world, come from inanimate processes and supposedly unintelligent natural systems. Thus, as a product of our physicality, those ideals have no moral force, but only utility, by which to base peace and order within society.
However, claims against free will, that decision making is determined by our physical nature, denies in essence, the possibility of rationality. Rational insight in essence needs to be non-deterministic to come to logical conclusions independent of our physicality. And it would not be true to say that to add a random physical stimuli directly to the brain, would change a logical conclusion of rational insight. Otherwise, anyone’s belief in anything, even when supported by good reasons, would be, according to determinism, an illusion.
In the experiment observing the brain function of decision making, differences in brain function, presumably in making the same decision under the same circumstances, differed so much from subject to subject, that predictions were little better than outright guessing. And that only where the observed had to make one choice from two options. The 7-second brain activity was probably an indication of anticipation, as each person was, no doubt, primed for the timing of the decision. Many of our decisions are comparatively instantaneous. Apparently when in natural free fall, the resulting adrenalin rush speeds up our perception as our brain functions at a faster rate, capturing greater detail. One woman recalled that in a car accident, she was thrown through the air, during which her whole life seemed to flash before her eyes and that it was incredibly boring.
Far from being annoyed at the application of the little crop-circles story, I find it more amusing than anything, in that it often pops up when folk in discussion get frustrated that others don’t ‘get-it’. I have similar frustrations when trying to make a point, but, as you indicate, it probably has more to do with conviction than with clarity.
Holy Moly!
That was hard going but I managed to get through it. In the blog format it might pay to keep each post fairly short and concise so that the conversation flows fairly easily.
You make some very good points in there but first I’m going to do a meta-analysis of your post to cut out what I see as dross and get to the meat of what you are saying.
First of all, it seems that the only places you use the words “fact” or “reality” are where you are really only talking about your personal beliefs about a god. As you can imagine this is not going to be useful in a conversation where we all know that these are by no means factual in the everyday sense of the term. The way you framed the first paragraph almost stopped my from continuing on.
You then lead into what I think is an important concept and that’s the issue of how we, as humans, measure reality. This is worthy of a whole topic all on it’s own but if we are to get anywhere with this particular topic we might have to set this one aside until later except I’ll say that, so far, the scientific approach of naturalistic assumption, prediction and falsifiability has proved to be the most fruitful and least prone to permanent error than many other assumptions.
Actually, there’s no way I’m going to have time to address every point in your post. There’s some good stuff there though and it’s worth addressing. Perhaps we’ll get onto it in the course of our ‘dialogue’
. I’m just going to address your comments on the topic of omniscience and free will.
You seem to take it that God can know what you are going to do in the future but that this won’t affect what you choose to do if he doesn’t tell you what he knows. I have a couple of questions about this though:
1. If he told someone else what you were going to do would this make a difference?
2. If God knows what you are going to do in the future do you think you can ‘choose’ to do otherwise?
I’m sorry, I didn’t realise you were so allergic to the use of the words ‘fact’ and ‘reality’ in reference to God, even within propositional language. What became of my use of them in reference to science? However, I have noticed that you also use the words ‘fact’ and ‘reality’ when expressing your own personal beliefs about there being no god.
Doing so, does not necessarily undermine our understanding of reality, but reveals our particular perspective and approach, in the process we have in developing any understanding of the universe. I’m not sure that you understand how fundamental rational insight is to this. That’s why I appear to labour that point in many of our exchanges.
As you know I have no problem with what science throws up as a comprehensive, consistent and cohesive understanding of our universe in the terms of reference it uses to do so.
The problem with being concise, whatever the medium of exchange, is that very often important assumptions, which are essential to understanding, are forgotten. Maybe you have heard of or read Marshall McLuhan’s, ‘The Medium is the Message: An Inventory of Effects’, which has an interesting take on what we use to communicate and its effect on the meaning of what we attempt to communicate.
So to answer your questions:
Firstly, I presume the difference you refer to, is in a substantial reduction in my ability to make a decision on my own? No, it wouldn’t. How could it? Neither God nor anyone is taking action, forcing my hand or telling me what to think.
Your second question, I think, basically rephrases your first. :O
Where? I’m generally very careful not to make fact claims about the existence of gods. I genuinely believe that we can’t know. Either way.
Nope. This was the key question and one I’m really trying to get a clear answer from you on so I’ll restate it:
Do you personally believe that you can choose to do ‘A’ in the future when God already knows that you are going to do ‘B’? Yes or no?
That God already knows what I have chosen, has to do with the attribute of God being timeless and therefore knows the beginning to the end of our timeframe. The attribute of mankind’s existence is that we are within that timeframe that God knows from end to end. Therefore he knows what we don’t about what we, from our point of view, are yet to choose. The question does not account of that dimensional difference and also insists on some kind of constraint of one over the other.
To be perfectly honest with you, I believe the question you ask is comparable to asking someone to design a round square and remains nonsensical. From the beginning, I’ve been trying to restrain myself from saying so, without wanting to be glib.
Geez! That was a long one, BC!!
Good to see things clicking along here…
I’ll offer a brief analogy and then head to bed…
Once upon a time, I decide to (for example) post this very comment I am posting now.
Months later, I will be able to (possibly!) remember my decision to post this comment. My memory of that decision has no ability whatsoever to influence it one way or the other.
Now, the analogy (and all analogies are limited) is that with God, his memory (past), observance (present) and even his fore-knowledge (future) of my choices do not make the choices un-real or manipulated, etc.
off to bed now…
-d-
Let’s get some perspective here BC.
If it seems that my question is nonsensical to you I’d suggest that the proposition is nonsensical in the first place. I’m not the one positing an entity that exists in another dimension who drops in from time to time to tell us not to do what he already knows we are going to do.
An entity who is all-knowing and all-powerful but when he (‘he’???) deigns to drop in and talk to us it’s to tell us the specifics of animal sacrifice and where and when we should kill people with rocks. No hints about how to avoid catastrophe unless you count Noah’s flood (which appears to have left absolutely no mark on the earth at all). No life-saving breakthroughs. Nothing novel to add. In fact, the god revealed in scripture contains all the attributes and foibles of the people of the time. Strange eh?
To quote Dawkins, this entity is (according to scripture) a “misogynistic, homophobic, racist, infanticidal, genocidal, filicidal, pestilential, megalomaniacal, sadomasochistic, capriciously malevolent bully”.
Capable of parting the Red Sea, turning sticks into snakes and pouring out plagues on the earth but completely hobbled by the fact that some nation’s army had iron chariots.
No, when you are positing an entity who is outside of time who also is one who is actively involved not only in our actions but in our very creation and you posit that we have free will then the only nonsense is with the proposition. It’s like a bandage on a bandage on a bandage and, as per my ‘crop circle nutter’ analogy a while back I’m afraid you’re in too deep to see it.
Argh! Perspective! Perspective!
Is that what’s missing from this discussion.
I’m pretty sure that perspective is pretty much what any discussion is about.
No one speaks from a neutral or all-knowing perspective.
Now, if the perspective you speak of is of your own, then my response to your question (prompted initially from your knowledge that I am a Christian), may be but nonsense to you.
However, from my perspective, (and not only my own), it is not nonsense, and neither is the perspective of understanding where science and philosophy work together.
In saying the question you ask is nonsensical I was not saying that you are nonsensical. It is a question that has been asked by school children through to eminent philosophers.
The question of freewill is contentious within both theist and atheist circles, with little agreement from opposing sides of the argument.
The reasonableness of such a question has to do with the interior logic and conditions under which it is made and not necessarily with distortions introduced by the prejudices of the people who are considering the question. Unfortunately, such prejudices, at times, overcome the question and nothing is resolved, even in effectively agreeing to disagree.
Our conversation regarding freewill, as has been pointed out previously, is not an argument in support or against the existence of God.
The quotation of Richard Dawkins, is one of the most unfortunate things that has been written by anyone who is regarded as a thinking person. It has all the hallmarks of a raving illiterate, itinerant evangelist! Unfortunately, it betrays his intellect and reveals his paucity of understanding (to which he freely admits) of the subject of which he purports to be nonsense and in which he also claims to have no interest! I’m not sure why he doesn’t ignore it all together and move on. Maybe, fundamentally, Dawkins thinks, like Lloyd Geering, he is out to save the world from religion and fundamentalism.
The kind of discussion I was hoping for here BC was one where we look at a proposition (i.e. “free will exists”) and then examine the boundaries to see if the proposition breaks down. Hence the questions of “do other creatures have it?”, “when do we get it?” and so on. And if we’re examining the proposition that we don’t in fact have free will then how do we explain our seeming ability to make choices and that it certainly feels like we’re free agents (to an extent).
Approaching it from this angle we can come at the question from a common ground of observation and identify the strengths and weaknesses of each argument.
This approach of examining the boundaries also helps to identify what it is we mean by “free will”.
So, if you are willing to tackle it from this angle would you be happy to define what you see free will as being?
I’ll presume you think that we (humans at least) have free will
1. Do you think all humans have free will? (i.e. infants, people in a coma, etc)
2. Do you think that other animals have free will?
2a. If you think that animals have free will then do you think that bacteria have free will?
2b. If not, where do you think free will starts in humans? (conception? birth?)
3. Machines with free will? Ever?
4. Whatever your answers are for these, can you think of good ways we can test the validity of your conclusions?
Yes, Damian, you did begin this long conversation (64 comments currently) this way, but later you’ve been (apparently) happy to involve ‘god aspects’ in the conversation; for example, asking:
Such things do come up… perspective is asked for, and given… (and apparently not appreciated?)
Fine if you now wish to leave such things out of the conversation, but that is your own (free?) choice.
Hey Dale! How’s everything going over there in the US of A? How was your sister’s wedding? (or has it not been yet?)
Regarding the conversation on free will and it’s subsequent descent into metaphysics; I apologise. I shouldn’t have let myself be dragged in to conversations about untestable personal beliefs. And I shouldn’t have sited the omniscience/free will argument if I wanted the conversation to revolve around observable evidence.
BC hasn’t given his/her thoughts on the questions from #64 yet and the only answer I can find of yours is that you believe that regardless of the outcome we should still have responsibility. So where do you think free will starts and ends? (as per either the original questions or those of #64)
Cheers Damian, the wedding yas not been yet; and we’re really enjoying the time here. Great to catch up with friends and family… and I got myself a nice “National Rifle Association” cap…
I would myself use the word ‘descent’ (regarding the metaphysical direction the conversation took), but I can see why you would. I guess (once again) it’s key to have things defined before you meaningfully discuss them. If we assume (a priori) that the conversation about free will necessarily is non-metaphysical (indeed, if we assume — a priori — that free will’s definition has positively nothing to do with any metaphysical ideas, etc.), then we can still have a good discussion, but the specific restriction to non-metaphysicality must be noted…
want to write more, but dinner is ready!!!
-d-
There is a place for metaphysics but there comes a time when it’s good to examine real-world examples of a metaphysical proposition to see if things stack up. I’m sure you could find metaphysical arguments that prove that gravity does or doesn’t exist but, for me, the best bit is when you observe a ball being dropped and half of the ‘interesting’ metaphysical arguments go out the window.
I look forward to your thoughts on the observable boundaries of free will.
Like your comment on “metaphysics”, Damian. It’s always best to deal with objective facts or phenomena, rather than philosophical labels, I think. The later tend to lead us to discussing weird concepts which mean different things to different people. At least when we are constrained to discussing real examples, or bringing back ideas to objective reality, we can always check what is meant.
free will = pondered for centuries/millenia…
gravity = not…
off to bed now, if I get time, I’ll comment on your points…
-d-
“free will = pondered for centuries/millenia…
gravity = not…” …anymore.
Aristotle’s theory that heavier objects fall faster than light objects could have easily been dispelled using the tools and observations of the era but it took nearly 2000 years before Galileo proved this wrong — by simple, real-world observations.
But here I am again allowing myself to ‘descend’ into the pros and cons of metaphysics! If I didn’t know you better I’d be suspecting that you are deliberately avoiding having to examine real-world evidence.
I’ll add another question to that list in #64 while I think about it:
2c. If only humans, at what point in our evolutionary past? (The best evidence at this stage point to Homo sapiens emerging around 200,000 years ago with the first signs of civilisation around 60,000 years ago).
Your presumption is correct Damian. But there’s really no need to be so tentative, dear boy, since I think I’ve made it pretty clear what I think about freewill.
1. Since I don’t know all humans, I will reserve my assumption to the ones I know. At present may late sister, father and mother are not practising their free will. I know my spouse and children do. I also observe that my colleagues at work and those of other associations also practise freewill. Without having done experiments on any of these subjects, under various conditions, both extreme and what we might call normal, I’m am fairly confident, by my observation of their behaviour, in respect of decision making, those behaviours display all the features of freewill.
2. Having observed Fred the goldfish quite often, swimming within the confines of a glass aquarium, apparently moving randomly, without the observable influence of external factors, Fred appears to move about under his own volition.
2a. You may no more about bacteria than I, so I have no idea if bacteria have freewill. Do they have any cognisance?
2b. Where it starts with humans is probably only observable where there is a conflict of wills. This we know starts quite early in infancy. Random movements and responses in the womb may display freewill in action.
3. It would be a brave person to say that machines would ever have freewill, since self awareness together with rational insight are perculiarly, highly developed in humans.
4. Testing the limits of freewill could be done through drugging subjects and putting them through a maze of intellectual exercises to see if their responses show any level of self awareness and rational insight.
I had to laugh at a vision I had of you and Ken picking up facts, like you would bugs or autumn leaves, as you sauntered through life under an overarching blue sky of metaphysics. The air of which blew through your hair and filling your lungs, sustaining you as you observed and marvelled at the world. Such is the world of science.
Damian has a shaved head…
Well, maybe, he can remember when . . .
Interestingly, that brings to mind the role of faith in a particular way of thinking; your perception of the world is coloured by what you believe the world is and how it can be apprehended, just like wind and hair!
Very poetic. But meaningless. I could make a lovely analogy about strong, brave people grounded in reality while the feeble huddle in their rooms mulling only on the theoretical. But I won’t because it’s a dishonest way of misrepresenting how we go about finding the truth about the world in which we live. I agreed that there is a place for metaphysics but metaphysics that ignores evidence is nothing more than fantasy.
But back to the topic.
I was surprised that you seem to allow free will in goldfish. I think we (as Ken pointed out a long time ago) have different definitions of free will. Just for clarity, you seem to imply that a goldfish has free will because it can “move about under his own volition” and you ask whether a bacteria has cognition to qualify for free will. What, to you, qualifies as a defining trait of free will?
Sorry BC, I think you may have actually defined what it is that you see free will as being in your comment,
So would it be accurate to say that you see free will as the ability to show self awareness and rational insight?
I realise that I’m inferring a definition from what might have been a throw-away comment so it might pay to let you phrase your definition as you see fit.
I haven’t really thought about a good definition myself yet but if I were to take a stab in the dark I’d say that free will would have to be demonstrably free of external influence. I.e. that someone may ‘choose’ to have chocolate and that there may be physical factors that go into this choice (like taste buds or hunger or TV advertising) but that somewhere in this process is an independent agent that can swing the ‘choice’ either way. Does this sound like what you’d see free will as being?
Poetry sometimes helps us to see the wood from the trees. However . . .
As you were referring to perspective earlier, the perspective of seeing the metaphysic as only an adjunct to ‘really’ knowing the ‘real’ world through science, is a perspective very much at odds with the philosophy of science. It is the metaphysic that defines what we call evidence and gives a value to whatever we observe in the ‘real’ world. Without that perspective, science just wouldn’t be.
Again, there is tendency toward a false metaphysical dichotomy, where science verses philosophy or religion. Nothing could be further from the truth. Science is built on the metaphysic. Without the evidence of one, founded on the other, both become nonsense.
The topic . . . freewill . . .
The idea of freewill, in the practical sense, has never demanded that it is necessarily, demonstrably free from outside influences (ie. Genuine Free Will™). In fact, it is within a world of many inputs and alternative reactions and choices that freewill can be demonstrated by the limited knowledge of experience.
Otherwise, as you may like to maintain, the world is purely deterministic in all respects.
Maybe we then could say that the universal order, as currently observed, is set in such a way as to allow freewill to operate. In other words, if freewill has been determined by natural forces yet to be discovered, those natural forces don’t necessarily set the pattern of any individual behaviour at any one time. Maybe natural processes are limited to being partnered with freewill, as characterised by brain structure that can been altered and renewed through changes in external behaviour.
In this regard self-awareness and rational insight do seem to be differentiated from natural processes. Therefore, as such and as non-deterministic traits, they tender support for a freewill perspective.
Cheers BC. I’m still not 100% sure what you define free will as being. Can I get you to give me a succinct definition as you see it?
A succinct definition eh?
For what it may be worth . . .
Let’s see . . . the ability to make or defer a choice at any time, with or without prejudice to perceived, favourable or unfavourable conditions or consequences.
Ah yes, I can see how you can define a goldfish as having free will now.
I don’t know if you know much about programming but there are some pretty clever programs that can ‘learn’ by experimentation and a bit of fuzzy logic. Humans set the initial parameters but the program, over time, becomes far more ‘intelligent’ than the initial parameters would have you think. They even can make unpredictable choices which they remember and keep for future comparisons.
In the future it’s quite conceivable that there will be computer programs that are indistinguishable from another human being.
Would this then fit within your definition of free will?
Ken, earlier on in this conversation you made mention of Dr Zimbardo. There is an interesting criticism of his methods and conclusions in this week’s Skeptoid podcast if you are interested. (Transcript linked to)
Thanks for the info Damian. I do subscribe to Skeptoid but haven’t actually been following it lately after listening to his talk on nuclear power (which I found a bit too dogmatic).
Hehe, I know what you mean. But I love to get all sides of an argument.
Listened to his take on Zimbardo. Some of his points may be valid from an abstract point of view but in the real world things are not done that way, so I think he is being dogmatic again. For example, it’s just not realistic to expect scientists to go into an investigation without a preconceived model and it’s only natural that scientists will look to prove their model. It’s the social aspect of science which “keeps them honest.”
It’s a pity he didn’t provide names and links to those scientists who specifically disagree with Zimbardo’s conclusions. I think that would be of value.
‘Freewill’ programming?
Sometimes we can be in danger of truncating an idea according to the limited application of the idea we are exploring.
In respect to programming being ‘intelligent’ by its demonstration of complexity and unpredictability, such programming is in effect a reflection of the intelligence that created the original code. Specifically, such programming seems to leave out the characteristics of human freewill of rational insight and self-awareness.
My understanding of fuzzy logic is that it attributes specific values in response to measurable inputs, thereby inducing a measured response (rather than an on/off response). Under certain conditions a computer controlled machine can ‘learn’ to give a somewhat measured response, based on previous recorded responses under similar conditions. If the machine fails to respond, then either it has failed or there is some other variable with which the machine is encumbered or has encountered that has not yet been considered by the designer.
If future computer programs that are supposed one day to be indistinguishable from human beings, hopefully they won’t have the same innate ‘inadequacies’ that current human ‘programs’ display!
I suspect that any artificial intelligence that comes close to human intelligence and mind will not be “designed”, “built” or “programmed” in the way they are now. The brain/mind/consciousness just doesn’t look like a “designed” “built” thing. It is a living thing which means a constant ability top change and evolve without any outside interference (or as a response to that interference).
I suspect that to attain artificial intelligence approximating human intelligence we will have to actual design/build a living thing capable of its own self adjustment to the environment and probably also capable of evolving. It is the life and evolution of such a thing which will enable its intelligence to eventually approach that of humans.
Ha! True, true.
You say,
This would seem to now eliminate Fred the goldfish from having free will. Perhaps your initial definition of free will as being “the ability to make or defer a choice at any time, with or without prejudice to perceived, favourable or unfavourable conditions or consequences” needs an amendment to include the self-awareness and rational insight factors?
And while you are there, what is ‘rational insight’? Being able to compare and predict?
Freewill can apply to animals in a less than human way. Rational insight and self awareness are general qualities in humans, but are much less characteristic (or comprehended by us) of animals such as Fred the goldfish.
Both qualities, in the broader application, are involved in how we comprehend the world and operate within it as human beings, and is not only associated with freewill.
Well then it would seem that by your definition there are computer programs that exist already that have free will.
Hey – just saw this.
It’s called the ‘Chinese Room Argument’ – relating to whether or not ‘artificial intelligence’ is possible.
What are your thoughts on this Dale? And is the term “artificial intelligence” interchangeable with “consciousness”?
I find it an interesting analogy. Whether or not it confirms or challenges ‘AI’, it helps frame a discussion (or at least one point of a discussion). Just because something ‘looks’ conscious, doesn’t mean it is, I suppose.
I find consciousness quite interesting. Funny how we can experience levels of self-awareness (waking in the morning is a perfect example). I wonder if the process of ‘waking up’ is at all analogous to pre-human stages of consciousness?
Good point. And even the process we go through as infants and then children too. Once again I suspect that our greatest mistake is to think that ‘consciousness’ is a binary state but that it is actually a gradual process (or a combination of different things i.e. self-awareness, intent, language, etc, etc).
So, on examining the Chinese Room Argument do you think that it is technically possible to build a machine that will one day be ‘conscious’? Whatever ‘consciousness’ really is.
I wouldn’t say never, but I’m not placing any bets on it anytime soon.
And I think you’re right to say “whatever ‘consciousness’ really is” – it’s not at all like we’ve got it sussed. 
Quite right, I’ve yet to see a good definition.
If you’re looking into consciousness I have the excellent Consciousness – an introduction textbook by Susan Blackmore if you would like to borrow it.
one of my most significant frustrations is having too many interests…
too many books to read (not to mention blogs) sigh… I wouldn’t mind browsing it, though
I hear ya!